Does a smaller population mean shorter queues, more affordable housing, and less congested cities? The question arises because fertility rates are declining in many countries, but a shrinking population doesn’t automatically make everyday life more pleasant. It all depends on the speed of the change, its distribution, and the collective choices that accompany it.
A strong trend, but not a single prediction
First published on June 2, 2026, and republished on September 29 by Courrier International , the Financial Times article takes as its starting point the decline in birth rates in several countries, from China to France. The topic invites us to look beyond simply counting births: low fertility does not necessarily mean that the population will immediately decrease, and demographic projections are not certainties.
According to the United Nations, the world’s population could continue to grow until the mid-2080s, before declining slightly by 2100. However, this The decline is therefore neither simultaneous nor uniform. ( un.org )
Fewer people: a possible relief, but not an automatic one
In areas experiencing population decline, less pres on housing, transportation, and certain infrastructure is conceivable. However, this does not automatically translate into an easier life. A vacant dwelling in a region losing residents does not necessarily meet the needs of a household in a densely populated metropolis. Similarly, a decrease in usage can reduce the burden on a public service—or make its maintenance more difficult if users and revenue dwindle.
Geography matters as much as the national average. A city can continue to suffer from a housing shortage while remote communities lose residents, businesses, and services. Demographics do not spontaneously redistribute resources: transportation, housing policies, and the organization of services determine whether a decrease in population pres translates into a tangible benefit.
The challenge of aging
The decline in births also alters the age structure. When younger generations are smaller and life expectancy increases, the need for care and support can grow relative to the available workforce. The debate, therefore, is not simply about « how many of us will there be? », but about how to finance and organize work, healthcare, and intergenerational solidarity.
A study published in The Lancet in 2020 illustrates the uncertainty of long-term scenarios: in its baseline scenario, the authors projected a decline of more than 50% by 2100 for 23 countries, while the Chinese population was expected to decrease by 48% compared to 2017. These are modeling results based on assumptions, not a guaranteed timeline. United Nations projections rely on a different methodology and result in estimates that may differ. ( pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov )
France, a reference point to be handled with precision
Recent French data confirms a marked decline in births, but calls for a more nuanced understanding of historical comparisons. In 2025, 643,905 babies were born in France, according to INSEE; excluding Mayotte, this is the lowest annual number since 1942. This figure describes births, and not, on its own, the total population change, which also depends on deaths and migration. ( insee.fr )
A matter of collective choices
Talking about « collapse » dramatizes a transition whose effects will depend as much on societies as on population trends. Fewer inhabitants could reduce certain forms of competition; it could also weaken services and exacerbate tensions related to aging. The promise of easier lives is therefore not inherent in the demographic decline itself. It will depend on the ability to better distribute housing, jobs, and services—and to adapt institutions to older and sometimes smaller populations.
Main source: Courrier international – News from France and around the world, videos, infographics (www.courrierinternational.com)
Original article: See the original source
Additional sources
